Abstract: Smart home devices are vulnerable to passive inference attacks based on network traffic, even in the presence of encryption. In this paper, we present PingPong, a tool that can automatically extract packetlevel signatures (i.e., simple sequences of packet lengths and directions) from the network traffic of smart home devices, and use those signatures to detect occurrences of specific device events (e.g., light bulb turning ON/OFF). We evaluated PingPong on popular smart home devices ranging from smart plugs to thermostats and home security systems. We have successfully: (1) extracted packet-level signatures from 18 devices (11 of which are the most popular smart home devices on Amazon) from 15 popular vendors, (2) used those signatures to detect occurrences of specific device events with an average recall of more than 97%, and (3) shown that the signatures are unique among tens of millions of packets of real world network traffic.
. However, these passive inference techniques still have limitations. Most can only identify the device type and whether there is device activity, but not the exact type of activity or command [8-11, 25, 34, 35] . Others only apply to a limited number of devices from a specific vendor [12] , or need more information from other protocols [1, 40] and the application source code [40] . Techniques that rely on traffic volume analysis can be obfuscated by traffic shaping [1, 8] . Finally, most threat models assume that IP traffic is sniffed upstream from the home router, while the more practical scenario where a local attacker sniffs encrypted Wi-Fi traffic has received less attention [8, 19] .
In this paper, we consider the smart home environment, shown in Figure 1 . We experiment with a diverse range of smart home devices, namely 19 popular Wi-Fi and Zigbee devices from 16 different vendors, including smart plugs, light bulbs, thermostats, home security systems, etc. We focus on inferring simple commands, such as "toggle ON"/"toggle OFF", which we refer to as events. Limiting the focus on such events has two implications: (i) it enables the extraction of distinct and accurate network signatures; and (ii) it makes the techniques widely applicable, since all devices, both simple (e.g., smart plugs) and complex (e.g., smart home assistants) exhibit such events. Our goal is to identify network signatures for device events, based on encrypted network traffic observed at two different vantage points: (i) on the ISP side of the home router or (ii) at the local Wi-Fi network.
During our experimentation with these devices and our in-depth analysis of their network behavior (see Section 3.2), we made the key observation that events on smart home devices typically result in communication between the device, the smartphone, and the cloud servers that contains pairs of packets with predictable lengths. Typically, a packet pair consists of a request packet from a device/phone ("Ping") and a reply packet back to the device/phone ("Pong"). In most cases, the packet lengths are distinct for different types of events, thus one can infer which event occurred by observing these packet exchanges. Building on this key observation, we were able to identify new packet-level signatures (or signatures for short), which were not previously known. Our packet-level sig-natures consist only of the lengths and directions of a few packets exchanged between a smart home device, a smartphone, and cloud servers. This pattern can be generalized into a variety of other commands beyond "toggle ON/OFF", e.g., "Intensity"/"Color" for light bulbs and "Standby"/"Hibernate"/"Active" for sprinklers. We show that these signatures can be extracted in an automated and systematic way, can be used to infer fine-grained information (e.g., the exact types of events, which was not previously possible), and have a number of advantages compared to prior (e.g., volumebased) signatures. More specifically, this paper makes the following contributions.
New Packet-Level Signatures. We discover a new type of network traffic signatures for smart home devices, which was not previously observed. We refer to these signatures as packet-level signatures. The signatures are simple and minimal: they consist of short sequences of packets of specific lengths (2 to 6 packets in total), exchanged between the device, the smartphone, and the cloud. The signatures are also effective. First, they detect event occurrences with an average recall of more than 97%, surpassing state-of-the-art techniques [1] . Second, they are unique: we observe a few false positives (on average 19 per device) in smart home network traces with tens of millions of packets (see Section 5.3). Third, they seem to be universal: we extract signatures for 18 out of 19 devices (only one UDP-based device does not follow the request-reply pattern), including the most popular home security devices such as the Ring Alarm Home Security System and Arlo Q Camera. Fourth, they operate on encrypted traffic and survive some forms of traffic shaping [8] . Fifth, they allow an attacker to detect events quickly as they only rely on packet lengths and directions, and thus do not require the attacker to first collect aggregate traffic volume statistics or prior DNS traffic.
Automated Extraction of Packet-Level Signatures.
We present PingPong, a software tool that automates the extraction of packet-level signatures, and detects signatures in network traces and real network traffic. For signature extraction, PingPong first generates training data by repeatedly triggering the event, for which a signature is desired, while capturing network traffic. Next, PingPong extracts pairs of packet lengths and directions per flow ("Ping-Pong"), clusters these pairs, and post-processes them to concatenate pairs into longer sequences where possible. Finally, sequences with frequencies close to the number of triggered events are selected for the final signature. The signature detection part of PingPong leverages the simplicity of packetlevel signatures and is implemented using simple state machines. Compared to prior unsupervised techniques for extracting network signatures, PingPong has the following advantages. First, it uses fewer and simpler features, namely packet lengths and packet directions, as opposed to traffic volume [1, 8-12, 25, 34, 35] , which requires more computation and state to be maintained. Second, as opposed to black-box machine learning techniques [1] , the extracted packet-level signatures have an intuitive explanation: request and reply packets are exchanged between the device, the smartphone, and the cloud; hence, the name PingPong. We plan to make the PingPong software tool, the collected training data, and the extracted signatures publicly available.
Two Threat Models. We show that packet-level signatures are observable under two different threat models. In both threat models, the adversary first uses PingPong in a controlled environment similar to the one in Figure 1 to extract signatures for the targeted device(s). This is done offline prior to the attack. The attack is then performed by matching the extracted signatures against traffic at the site of the attack. The threat models differ in terms of the vantage point where traffic is inspected and the strategy for how it is matched against the extracted signatures. The first adversary, referred to as WAN sniffer, monitors network traffic at the link that connects the home router to the ISP network. This adversary has been considered before [8] [9] [10] [11] , and the signatures developed therein could typically infer the device type and whether an event took place, but did not differentiate types of events (e.g., ON vs. OFF). In contrast, our signatures can infer the specific type of event more precisely than the state-of-the-art. The second adversary, referred to as Wi-Fi sniffer, monitors the encrypted IEEE 802.11 traffic, and has not been widely studied before [8, 19] . We show that the Wi-Fi sniffer can accurately distinguish between different types of events, despite not having access to network and transport layer information.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines related work. Section 3 presents our experimental setup, threat models, and an illustrative example of packet-level signatures in smart plugs. Section 4 presents the design of the PingPong system, including extraction and detection of signatures. Section 5 presents the evaluation of PingPong, using our testbed as well as external, publicly available, packet traces. Section 6 concludes and outlines directions for future work. Due to lack of space, we defer the details of signature detection and the sensitivity analysis of PingPong parameters to Appendices A and B, respectively.
Related Work
Security Vulnerabilities. Related work in this area has identified vulnerabilities that allow hackers to compromise Internet of Things (IoT) devices [13, 16-18, 21, 24, 38, 39] . A recent summary of security issues related to smart home IoT devices can be found in [3] . The research community is continuously working on identifying threats [13, 16, 19, 31, 38] and flaws in devices [17, 21, 27] and protocols [16, 18, 24, 39] .
Passive Inference Attacks. With respect to privacy breaches, network traffic analysis techniques have been recently applied to characterize the type and activity of IoT devices. The most closely related work to ours, which appears in the most recent PETS, uses network traffic volume signatures to infer the presence of IoT device activity [8] [9] [10] [11] 30] . Their work considers the same two threat models as we do. Our work improves on this previous work as their volume-based signatures can only infer the occurrence of some event, while our signatures can infer the exact type of the event. They propose stochastic traffic padding (STP) as a mitigation to their volume-based inference attacks, and discuss two possible implementations of STP: a VPN-based approach that only defends against WAN sniffers, and a device-based approach that defends against both WiFi and WAN sniffers. Our packet-level signatures would survive many implementations of the proposed devicebased STP as the traffic shaping would leave packet sizes unchanged.
Other projects focused on specific types of devices or protocols. In [12] , the authors analyze network traffic to infer the activity specifically for the Nest Thermostat and Nest Protect (only) and determined with 88% and 67% accuracy that the thermostat transitions between Home and Auto Away mode and vice versa-leaking sensitive information that reveals whether the home is occupied or not. Other work [1, 40] focused on Zigbee/ZWave devices and leveraged specialized Zigbee/Z-Wave sniffers to collect traffic from these protocols. Since the format of ZigBee packets is well documented, it facilitates the creation of the signatures, which makes the problem easier than our case. In [40] , the authors used the application source code to correlate Zigbee traffic and device events. Finally, as far as we know, the Wi-Fi sniffer threat model has not been widely studied: it has only been presented in [19] and [8] .
Machine Learning for Traffic Analysis. There is a large body of work within the network measurement community on applying machine learning techniques to network traffic to classify applications and identify anomalies [22, 23, 26] , attacks [14] , or malware [5, 29] . Similar approaches are starting to emerge for IoT network traffic: in addition to [30] discussed above, in [25, 34, 35] , the authors applied machine learning to network traffic, and were able to identify device type and the occurrence of some event, but not the exact type of the event. In [1] , the authors were able to identify device type and events. However, their techniques rely on statistical analysis of the TCP/IP network traffic time series (e.g., mean packet length, inter-arrival time, standard deviation in packet lengths, etc.) that can easily be obfuscated by the use of traffic shaping. Moreover, prior unsupervised learning approaches [1] are essentially "blackbox": they use a large number of features to extract events and it is difficult to understand the underlying cause and limitations of the signatures. PingPong also uses unsupervised learning (i.e., clustering) to identify the reoccurring packet pairs as the first step of our approach, but also provides an intuitive interpretation of those pairs.
Our Work in Perspective. Our work falls within this broader area of network signatures for IoT devices, and as such our network signatures have the advantages of (i) operating on possibly encrypted network traffic, (ii) not relying on application code or deep packet inspection, and (iii) being potentially generally applicable across several IoT devices. Compared to other state-ofthe-art network signatures for IoT, we make the contributions mentioned in the Introduction. In summary, PingPong is the only approach that combines all the following desired features: automated extraction of signatures, yet intuitive interpretation; simple/lightweight detection; universal applicability across the devices we examined; uniqueness (in large packet traces) and granularity (can detect not only the occurrence of an event, but also the exact type of the event); resilience to traffic shaping; and applicability to two distinct threat models (i.e., a WAN sniffer observing IP traffic upstream from the wireless router, and a Wi-Fi sniffer observing encrypted traffic on the local Wi-Fi network). 
Problem Setup
In this section, we present the smart home environment and the passive inference attacks we consider. We also provide a key insight we obtained by experimenting with the simplest devices-smart plugs-and by observing their network traffic caused by ON/OFF events. The packet sequences we observed in this motivating example, inspired the PingPong methodology for automatically extracting signatures (see Section 4).
Smart Home Environment and Experimental Testbed
Figure 1 depicts our experimental setup, which resembles a typical smart home environment. In our testbed, we experiment with a diverse set of 19 widely-used smart home devices from 16 different vendors (see Table 1 ). They are selected to cover a diverse range of functionality. The first 12 (highlighted in green) are the most popular on Amazon [4] : (1) each got the most reviews for every type (2) with at least 3.5-star rating-they are both popular and of high quality (e.g., the Nest T3007ES and Ecobee3 thermostats are the two mostreviewed with 4-star rating for thermostats). Some of them are connected to the router via Wi-Fi (e.g., the Amazon plug) and others through Ethernet. Each smart home device is controlled from the Smartphone using its vendor's official Android application. The Controller represents the agent that operates the smartphone to control the smart home device of interest. This may be done manually by a human (as in Section 3.2) or through software (as in Section 4). In addition, there are other computing devices (e.g., laptops, tablets, phones) in the house, generating network traffic, which we refer to as background traffic.
Smart home device events may result in communication between three possible pairs, as depicted on Figure 1 : (i) the smartphone and the smart home device (Phone-Device); (ii) the smart home device and an Internet host (Device-Cloud), and (iii) the smartphone and an Internet host (Phone-Cloud). The idea behind a passive inference attack is that network traffic on these three possible communication pairs may contain unique traffic signatures that can, in turn, be exploited to infer the occurrence of events.
The router in our testbed runs OpenWrt/LEDE [28] , a Linux-based OS for network devices, and serves as our vantage point for collecting traffic for experiments. We run tcpdump on the router's WAN interface (eth0) and local interfaces (wlan1 and eth1) to capture Internet traffic as well as local traffic for all Wi-Fi and Ethernet devices. We analyze this traffic for training and testing purposes.
The aforementioned testbed is used to train on network traffic of each targeted device, extract and store their signatures in files; see Sections 5.1. In Section 5.2, the same testbed is used for testing, i.e., to detect the presence of the stored signatures in traffic generated by all the devices as well as by other computers in the background.
Motivating Special Case: Smart Plugs
As an illustrative example, let us discuss a case study of 3 smart plugs, namely the TP-Link plug, the D-Link plug, and the SmartThings plug. Data for the case study was collected using the setup in Figure 1 . For each device, we toggled it ON, waited for approximately one minute, and then toggled it OFF. This procedure was repeated for a total of 3 ON and 3 OFF events, separated by one minute in between. Timestamps were manually noted for each event. The PCAP files logged at the router were analyzed using a combination of scripts and manual inspection in Wireshark.
New Observation: Packet Pairs. We identified the traffic flows that occurred immediately after each event and observed that certain pairs of packets with specific lengths and directions followed each ON/OFF event: the same pairs consistently showed up for all events of the same type (e.g., ON), but were slightly different across event types (ON vs. OFF). The pairs were comprised of a request packet in one direction, and a reply packet in the opposite direction. Intuitively, this makes sense: if the smart home device changes state, this information needs to be sent to (request), and acknowledged by (reply), the cloud server to enable devices that are not connected to the home network to query the smart home device's current state. These exchanges resemble the ball that moves back and forth between players in a game of pingpong, which inspired the name for our software tool presented in Section 4. Table 2 illustrates the observed packet exchanges. For the TP-Link plug, we noticed an exchange of 2 TLS Application Data packets between the plug and an Internet host where the packet lengths were 556 and 1293 when the plug was toggled ON, but 557 and 1294 for OFF. We did not observe any pattern in the D-Link plug's own communication. However, for ON events, the controlling smartphone would always send a request packet of length 1117 to an Internet host and receive a reply packet of length 613. For OFF, these packets were of lengths 1118 and 613, respectively. Similarly for the SmartThings plug, we found consistently occurring packet pairs in the smartphone's communication with two different Internet hosts where the lengths of the request packets were different for ON and OFF events (see Table 2 ). Thus, this request-reply pattern can occur in the communication of any of the three pairs: PhoneDevice, Device-Cloud, or Phone-Cloud (see Figure 1 ).
Key Insight. This preliminary analysis indicates that each type of event is uniquely identified by the exchange of pairs (or longer sequences) of packets of specific lengths. To the best of our knowledge, this type of network signature has not been observed before, and we refer to it as a packet-level signature. This discovery intrigued us to investigate whether: (1) more devices, beyond just smart plugs, exhibit their own packet-level signatures following an event, (2) packet-level signatures can be automatically extracted, and (3) packet-level signatures are accurate for detecting events while avoiding false positives. The design and evaluation of PingPong answers all these questions with a resounding YES.
Passive Inference: Two Threat Models
We consider two different threat models, referred to as WAN sniffer and Wi-Fi sniffer, respectively, depicted in Figure 1 . In both models, the adversary is a passive network traffic observer whose goal is to infer events that occurred in the smart home by detecting signatures in the observed network traffic. The adversary does not attempt to modify, nor inject, traffic, and does not have access to the smart home hardware. Moreover, both adversaries only consider information that is available in the clear, namely protocol headers, and, in contrast to other systems [20, 33] , do not perform deep packet inspection. Prior to the attack, both adversaries have determined what devices they want to attack and extracted signatures by profiling those devices in a controlled environment similar to the one in Figure 1 . The attack is performed by matching the signatures against traffic at the site of the attack. Wi-Fi sniffer. Similar to [8, 19] , we consider an attacker who is in range to eavesdrop on the smart home's encrypted Wi-Fi traffic, but who is not part of the local network. As the encryption added by WPA2 does not pad packet lengths, signatures extracted from TCP/IP traffic can be directly mapped to layer 2 if the IEEE 802.11 radiotap header, frame header, the AES-CCMP IV and key identifier, and FCS are accounted for. In our testbed, these consistently add 80 bytes to the packet length. While the WAN sniffer is only able to observe Internet traffic (Phone-Cloud and Device-Cloud in Figure 1) , the Wi-Fi sniffer observes all traffic on the Wi-Fi, including local traffic (Phone-Device in Figure 1 ). We assume that the Wi-Fi sniffer does not know the target device's full MAC address up front, but can filter by device vendor prefix when searching for Device-Cloud or Phone-Device signatures since the vendor prefix is already known in advance as the device used for training has the same prefix. For Phone-Cloud signatures, we assume no knowledge of MAC prefix as there are many Android smartphone manufacturers in the market. The Wi-Fi sniffer has the disadvantage of only having access to layer-2 header information due to WPA2 encryption. This means that they cannot reconstruct TCP connections, but can only separate traffic into flows of packets exchanged between pairs of MAC addresses, referred to as layer-2 flows. Consequently, when trying to detect a signature in a layer-2 flow, the Wi-Fi sniffer must use a more relaxed approach to matching: packets are allowed to be present in between the packets of the signature to accommodate other network-layer flows going on in parallel between the two MAC addresses.
PingPong Design
The key insight obtained from the special case in Section 3.2 was that unique sequences of packet lengths (for packet pairs or longer packet sequences) typically follow simple events (e.g., ON vs. OFF) on smart plugs, and can potentially be exploited as network signatures to infer these events. This observation motivated us to investigate whether: (1) more smart home devices, and potentially the smartphones that control them as well, exhibit their own unique packet-level sequences following an event, (2) these signatures can be learned and automatically extracted and from which vantage points in the network, and (3) they are sufficiently unique to accurately detect events. In this section, we present the design of PingPong-a system that addresses the above questions with a resounding YES. PingPong automates the collection of training data, extraction of packet-level signatures, and detection of the occurrence of a signature in a network trace. PingPong has two components: (1) training (Section 4.1), and (2) detection (Sections 4.2 and Appendix A). Figure 2 shows the building blocks and flow of PingPong on the left-hand side, and the TP-Link plug as an example that illustrates the process in every block on the right-hand side. We will use the latter as a running example throughout this section.
Training
The training component is responsible for the extraction of packet-level signatures for a device the attacker wants to profile and attack. It consists of 5 steps (see Figure 2) . Data Collection. The first step towards signature generation is to collect a training set for the device. A training set is a network trace (a PCAP file) that contains the network traffic generated by the device and smartphone as a result of a event. The setup for training set collection is comprised of the smart home device, a router, an Android smartphone, and a laptop as Controller (see Figure 1) . The device vendor's official Android app is installed on the smartphone, and the smartphone is connected to the laptop via USB.
PingPong partially automates training set collection by providing a shell script that uses the Android Debug Bridge (adb) [7] to issue touch inputs on the smartphone's screen. The script is tailored to issue the sequence of touch events corresponding to the events for which a training set is to be generated. For example, if a training set is desired for a smart plug's ON and OFF events, the script issues a touch event at the screen coordinates that correspond to the respective buttons in the user interface of the plug's official Android app. As device vendors may choose arbitrary positions for the buttons in their respective Android applications, and since the feature sets differ from device to device, the script must be manually modified for the given device. The script issues the touch sequence corresponding to each specific event n times, each separated by m seconds. The results reported in this paper uses n = 50 or n = 100 depending on the event type (see Section 5.1) and m = 131. The script also outputs the current timestamp to a file on the laptop when it issues a event. After we run tcpdump on the router's interfaces (see Section 3), the script is started. The tcpdump processes are terminated shortly after the n-th event has been issued. This leaves us with a set of PCAP files, which constitute our raw training set.
We base our signature generation on the traces collected from the router's local interfaces as they are the vantage points that provide the most comprehensive information: they include both local traffic and Internet traffic. This allows PingPong to exhaustively analyze all network packets generated in the communications between the device, smartphone, and Internet hosts on a per device basis. As signatures are based entirely on packet lengths and directions, signatures present in Internet traffic (i.e., Device-Cloud and Phone-Cloud traffic) are applicable on the WAN side of the router, despite being extracted from traces captured within the local network Trace Filtering. Next, PingPong filters the collected raw training set to discard traffic that is unrelated to Table 2 ). The Arlo camera has the most complex signature with 1 sequence of 2 pairs and 1 sequence of 1 pair. The left subfigure, in every row, depicts the packet lengths in one packet pair (Pc 1 , Pc 2 ). Notation: C->S means Client-to-Server ; S->C means Server-to-Client; f: 50 means that the pair appears in the clustering with a frequency of 50 ; Signature notation shows a summary of 2 sets of 50 instances of packet sequences. Example: S->C 556, 1293 f: 50 means that 50 pairs of packets with lengths 556 and 1293 appear 50 times in the dataset. a user's operation of a smart home device. All packets, where neither the source nor destination IP matches that of the device or the controlling smartphone, are dropped. Additionally, all packets that do not lie within a time window t after each timestamped event are discarded. We selected t = 15 seconds to ensure that we have allowed sufficient time for all network traffic related to the event to complete. We issue events every 131 seconds to allow sufficient time such that there is no overlap between events, while minimizing the total time needed to train. We then performed a further sensitivity study that confirmed this was a conservative choice (see Appendix B).
PingPong next reassembles all TCP connections in the filtered trace by considering the 4-tuple <source_IP, source_port, destination_IP, destination_port> and by observing any interleaved SYNs, FINs, and RSTs with a matching 4-tuple. The latter is meant to also cover the corner case where two subsequent TCP connections end up sharing the same ephemeral port number. Finally, all TCP retransmissions are discarded from the trace by maintaining a set of the previously seen sequence numbers for each of the two packet directions of a single TCP connection.
Given the set of reassembled TCP connections, we now turn our attention to the packets P that carry TCP payload. For TLS connections, P is limited further to only be the subset of packets that are labeled as "Application Data" in the unencrypted TLS record header [6] . By only considering packets in P , we ensure that the inherently unpredictable control packets (e.g., TCP ACKs and TLS key negotiation) do not become part of the signature as P only contains packets with application layer payload.
We next construct the set P � by forming packet pairs from the packets in P (see Definition 4.1). This is motivated by the following observation: the deterministic sequence of packets that make up packetlevel signatures often stem from a request-reply exchange between the device, smartphones, and some Internet hosts (see Section 3.2). Furthermore, since a packet pair is the simplest possible pattern, and since longer patterns (i.e., packet sequences-see Definition 4.2) can be reconstructed from packet pairs, we look for these packet pairs in the training set. For the TP-Link plug example in Figure 2 
and let C and S each denote client-toserver and server-to-client packet directions respectively, where a client is a smartphone or a device.
A packet pair p is then p = (C−P ci , S−P ci+1 ) or p = (S−P ci , C−P ci+1 ) iff P ci and P ci+1 go in opposite directions. Otherwise, if P ci and P ci+1 go in the same direction, or if P ci is the last packet in P c , the packet pair p = (C−P ci , nil) or p = (S−P ci , nil) is formed, and packet P ci+1 , if any, is paired with packet P ci+2 . Pair Clustering. After forming a set of packet pairs, relevant packet pairs (i.e., those that consistently occur after an event) must next be separated from irrelevant ones. This selection also needs to take into account that the potentially relevant packet pairs may have slight variations in lengths. Since we do not know in advance the packet lengths in the pairs, we use an unsupervised learning algorithm: DBSCAN [15] . This is an attempt to group packet pairs that are similar in terms of packet lengths and directions. DB-SCAN is provided with a distance function for comparing the similarity of two packet pairs, say p 1 and p 2 . The distance is maximal if the packet directions are different, e.g., if p 1 is comprised of a packet going from a local device to an Internet host followed by a packet going from an Internet host to a local device, while p 2 is comprised of a packet going from an Internet host to a local device followed by packet going from a local device to an Internet host. If the packet directions match, the distance is simply the Euclidean distance between the two pairs, i.e.,
, where p i j refers to the packet length of the j-th element of pair i. DBSCAN's parameters are � and minPts, which specify the neighborhood radius to consider when determining core points and the minimum number of points in that neighborhood for a point to become a core point respectively. We choose � = 10 and minPts = �n − 0.1n�, where n is the total number of events. We allow a slack of 0.1n to minPts to take into account that event-related traffic could occasionally have missing pairs, for example, caused by the phone app not responding to some of the automated events. We study the sensitivity of PingPong parameter values in Appendix B. Part (a) of Figure 3 illustrates the pair clustering process for the TP-Link plug. As there are 50 ON actions and 50 OFF actions, there has to be at least 45 (n = 50 =⇒ minPts = �50 − 0.1 × 50� = 45) similar packet pairs to form a cluster. In the example, two clusters are formed among the data points, namely the clusters with frequencies f: 50 and f: 98, respectively. Since these two clusters contain similar packet pairs that occur once or more during t, this indicates with high confidence that the packets are related to the event.
Signature Creation. Given the output produced by DBSCAN, PingPong next drops all clusters whose frequencies are not in the interval [�n − 0.1n�, �n + 0.1n�] in order to only include in the signature those clusters whose frequencies align closely with the number of events n. Intuitively, this step is to deal with chatty devices, namely devices that communicate continuously/periodically while not generating events. Consequently, PingPong only picks the cluster Pair 1 with frequency 50 for the TP-Link plug example in Figure 3 as a signature candidate since 50 is in [�n − 0.1n�, �n + 0.1n�] = [45, 55] when n = 50, whereas 98 is not. As a pair from this cluster occurs exactly once during t, there is high confidence that the pair is related to the event.
We next attempt to concatenate the packet pairs in the clusters, seeking to reassemble the longest packet sequences possible (see Definition 4.2). This increases the odds that a signature remains unique among other traffic. Naturally, packet pair concatenation is only performed when a device has more than one cluster. This is the case for the Arlo camera, but not the TP-Link plug. Packet pairs in clusters x and y are concatenated iff for each packet pair p x in x, there exists a packet pair p y in y such that p x and p y occurred consecutively in the same TCP connection. If there are more pairs in y than in x, said pairs of y are simply dropped when forming the concatenated cluster. The resulting concatenated cluster is referred to as a set of packet sequences (see Definition 4.3), and is reconsidered for concatenation with other clusters if possible. Finally, we sort the sets of packet sequences based on the timing of the sets' members to form a list of packet sequence sets (see Definition 4.4). For example, for the Arlo camera, this step produces a list in which the set Sequences 1 precedes the set Sequences 2 because there is always a packet sequence in Sequences 1 that precedes a packet sequence in Sequences 2. The purpose of this step is to make the temporal order of the sets of packet sequences part of the final signature. If no such order can be established, the set with the shorter packet sequences is discarded. Manual inspection of some devices suggests that the earlier sequence will often be the control command sent from an Internet host followed by the device's acknowledgment of the command, while the later sequence will stem from the device initiating communication with some other Internet host to inform that host about its change in status. Signature Validation. Before finalizing the signature, we validate it by running the detection algorithm (see Section 4.2) against the raw training set that was used to generate the signature. If PingPong detects at most n events, and the timestamps of detected events match the timestamps for events recorded during training, the signature is finalized as a valid packet-level signature (see Definition 4.5) and stored in a signature file. A signature can fail this check if it detects more events than the actual number of events in the training set (i.e., false positives). This can happen if the packet sequences in the signature frequently appear outside t.
Definition 4.5. Packet-level Signature. A packet-level signature is then a list of packet sequence sets that has been validated and finalized.
Signature File. A signature file stores a packet-level signature. Figure 3 shows that the TP-Link plug signature consists of 50 instances of packet sequences in set Sequences 1, but only one instance will be used during detection since all 50 are identical. Figure 3 -(b) shows the signature file for the Arlo camera. It is a list that orders the two sets of packet sequences, Sequences 1 and Sequences 2. Sequences 1 is comprised of 50 packet sequences, each comprised of two packet pairs. Sequences 2 is comprised of another 50 packet sequences, each comprised of a single packet pair. Since the sequences vary slightly in each set, all unique variations are considered during detection.
Detection
For signature detection, PingPong treats a network trace as a stream of packets and presents each individual packet to a set of state machines. A state machine is maintained for each packet sequence of the signature for each flow, i.e., TCP connection for the WAN sniffer or layer-2 flow for the Wi-Fi sniffer (see Sec. 3.3). A packet is only presented to the state machines associated with the flow that the packet pertains to. A state machine advances to its next state if the packet's length and direction matches the next packet in the modeled packet sequence. The state machines respond differently to packets that do not match the expected next packet depending on whether detection is applied at layer-2 or layer-3. For layer-2, such packets are simply ignored, whereas for layer-3 such packets cause the state machine to discard the current partial match (see Sec. 3.3). When a state machine reaches its terminal state, the packet sequence match is reported to a secondary module. This module waits for a packet sequence match for each packet sequence of the signature and verifies the inter-sequence timing constraints before finally declaring a signature match. Due to lack of space, we defer a more detailed explanation of the detection to Appendix A.
Evaluation
In this section, we present the evaluation of PingPong. In Section 5.1, we show that PingPong was able to automatically extract event signatures for 18 devices as summarized in Table 3 -11 of them are the most popular devices on Amazon (see Table 1 ). Section 5.2 uses the extracted signatures to detect events in a trace col- Table 3 . Summary of Signatures (�= signature extracted; × = signature not found).
lected from a realistic experiment on our smart home testbed. Section 5.3 presents the results of negative control experiments: it demonstrates the uniqueness of the PingPong signatures in large (i.e., with tens of millions of packets), publicly available, packet traces from smart home and office environments. Due to lack of space, we discuss the selection and sensitivity analysis of PingPong parameters in Appendix B.
Extracting Signatures from Smart Home Devices
Training Dataset. In order to evaluate the generalizability of packet-level analysis, we first used PingPong to automate the collection of training sets (see Table 4 . Smart home devices found to exhibit Phone-Cloud, Device-Cloud, and Phone-Device signatures (prefix PH indicates Phoneto-device direction and prefix D indicates Device-to-phone direction; the duration of each signature is measured from the first packet of the first sequence S1 to the last packet of the last sequence Sn; *the Roomba robot had a few events missed because the device failed to return to the base station after a back-to-station command at the time the app issued the following clean command; the Blossom sprinkler also had a few events missed because the app reported connection lost for some triggers).
Section 4.1) for all 19 smart home devices (see Table 1 ). Training sets were collected for every device under test, individually without any background traffic (see Figure 1) . The automation script generated a total of 100 events for the device. For events with binary values, the script generated n = 50 events for each event type (e.g., 50 ON and 50 OFF events). For events with continuous values, the script generated n = 100 events (e.g., 100
Intensity events for the Sengled light bulb).
Results Summary. For each training set, we next used PingPong to extract packet-level signatures (see Section 4.1) for each event type of the respective device. In summary, PingPong extracted signatures from 18 devices; see Table 3 .
PingPong found packet-level signatures that are observable in the device's Phone-Cloud, Device-Cloud, and Phone-Device communications; see Table 3 . We found that 14 devices have signatures that are observable in the device's Phone-Cloud or Device-Cloud communication, or both. Although the traffic is typically encrypted using TLSv1.2, the event still manifests itself in the form of a packet-level signature. PingPong also extracted signatures from the Phone-Device communication for 5 devices. These signatures are extracted from unencrypted local TCP/HTTP communication between the smartphone and the device. Table 4 presents the signatures that PingPong identified. Each line in a signature cell represents a packet sequence set, and the vertical positioning of these lines reflects the ordering of the packet sequence sets in the signature; see Section 4.1 for the notation definition. Table 3 ).
Light Bulbs. PingPong extracted signatures from 3 light bulbs: the Sengled, Hue, and TP-Link light bulbs. The Sengled light bulb has signatures in both the Phone-Cloud and Device-Cloud communications. Both the Hue and TP-Link light bulbs have signatures in the Phone-Device communication. Table 3 shows that PingPong also extracted signatures for events other than ON and OFF: Intensity for the Sengled light bulb, and Intensity and Color for the TP-Link light bulb. Finally, PingPong also extracted signatures from the Roomba robot in the Phone-Cloud. These signatures allow us to differentiate Clean/Back-to-station events.
Signature Validity. Recall that signature validation rejects a signature candidate whose sequences are present not only in the time window t, but also during the subsequent idle period (see Section 4.1). We saw such a signature candidate for one device, namely the LiFX light bulb. PingPong captured a signature candidate that is present also in the idle period of the TCP communication. Manual inspection revealed that the LiFX light bulb uses unidirectional UDP communication (i.e., no request-reply pattern) for events. We then drop such a signature candidate.
Smart Home Testbed Experiment
Testing Dataset. To see how effective the packet-level signatures are in detecting events, we collected a separate set of testing network traces and used PingPong to perform detection on them. We used the setup for dataset collection presented in Section 3.1 to collect one dataset for every device. Our smart home setup consists of 13 of the smart home devices presented in Ta While collecting a dataset, we generated events for the device under test. At the same time, we also connected the other 12 devices and activated them (e.g., toggled the smart plugs ON) so that they would generate network traffic. However, we do not generate events for these other devices. For the other 6 devices (the Amazon plug, Sengled light bulb, Ecobee thermostat, Rachio sprinkler, Roomba robot, and Ring alarm), we generated events for the device under test while activating all the 13 devices to generate network traffic without generating any events.
To generate background traffic as depicted in Figure 1 , we also set up 3 general purpose devices: a Motorola Moto g 6 phone that would play a Youtube video playlist, a Google Nexus 5 phone that would play a Spotify song playlist, and an Apple MacBook Air that would randomly browse top 10 websites [2] every 10-500 seconds. We used this setup to emulate the network traffic from a smart home when all devices are active.
Results Summary. The average recall of our packetlevel signatures is 97.3%: 91-100 matches per 100 expected events for the 18 devices with signatures (see Table 4). For some devices, we do not get 100 matches for certain events. In some cases, the events were not generated due to app bugs or device-specific issues. Manual inspection revealed that in other cases, the signatures were only partially present or they are present with more variations, e.g., S2: S-777 C-136 for the SmartThings plug might become S2: S-612 C-136 in some occasions. 
Negative Control Experiment
If the packet-level signatures are to be used to detect events in traffic in the wild, they must be sufficiently unique for each device compared to other traffic to avoid generating false positives. We evaluated the uniqueness of the signatures by performing signature detection on two datasets. The first dataset consists of traffic generated by similar devices (i.e., other smart home devices), while the second dataset serves to evaluate the uniqueness of the signatures among traffic generated by general purpose computational devices.
Dataset 1: UNSW Smart Home Traffic Dataset.
The first dataset [35] contains network traces for 26 smart home devices that are different from the devices that we generated signatures for. The list can be found in [37] . The dataset is a collection of 19 PCAP files, with a total size of 12.5GB and a total of 23,013,502 packets.
Dataset 2: UNB Simulated Office-Space Traffic
Dataset. This is the Monday trace of the CICIDS2017 dataset [32] and it contains simulated network traffic for an office space with two servers and 10 laptops/desktops with diverse operating systems. The dataset we used is a single PCAP file of 10.82GB, with a total of 11,709,971 packets observed at the WAN interface.
Results Summary. For both datasets, we performed signature detection for all devices using the WAN sniffer for devices with Phone-Cloud and Device-Cloud signatures, and the Wi-Fi sniffer for all 12 devices. WAN Sniffer. There was no false positive across 23,013,502 packets in dataset 1, while there is 1 false positive for the Nest thermostat across 11,709,971 packets in dataset 2.
Wi-Fi Sniffer. PingPong detected some false positives due to its more relaxed matching strategy (see Appendix A). The results, summarized in 
Conclusion and Future Work
Conclusion. In this paper, we designed, implemented, and evaluated PingPong, a tool that automatically extracts fine-grained information about smart home device events from encrypted network traffic. This work advances the state-of-the-art by: (1) identifying simple packet-level signatures that were not previously known; (2) using these signatures to infer specific information about events across a wide range of devices; and (3) showing that these signatures are effective for both WAN sniffer and Wi-Fi sniffer attackers. We plan to make the PingPong tool (software, training datasets and signatures files) available to the community.
Future Work. Our study also suggests that the packetlevel signatures we present in this paper can be used to create a more viable scenario for the MadIoT attack [36] , a type of cyberattack that synchronizes ON/OFF events of high-wattage devices to cause power-grid failures.
Our preliminary experiments have shown that it is possible to delay and synchronize ON/OFF events for some of the high-wattage devices in our set (i.e., the thermostats and smart plugs) by filtering the signature packets on the router. Other directions for future work include: analyzing more complex devices (e.g., home assistants) and events generated by smart home appli-cations (e.g., motion detection), using PingPong for real-time matching and anomaly detection, and exploring the robustness of our signatures in the presence of traffic shaping (e.g., STP) and VPN. Future work in defenses to PingPong includes exploring techniques for padding packets to the same length, although they may not completely eliminate the threat as the number of packets or their timing may still leak information.
A Detection
Section 5.2 briefly discussed how PingPong treats a network trace as a stream of packets and performs signature detection by presenting each individual packet to a set of state machines. In this Appendix, we present additional details for how this is implemented. For every packet in a sequence, there are two possible matching strategies: exact and range-based matching. In exact matching, the state machines only consider exactly those packet lengths that were observed during training (see Section 5.1) as valid. In the rangebased matching strategy, the state machines allow the packet lengths to lie between the minimum and maximum packet lengths (plus a small delta) observed during training. As such, range-based matching attempts to accomodate packet sequences that have slight variations where all permutations may not have been observed during training. For range-based matching, the lower and upper bounds for each packet of a packet sequence are derived from the core points of the packet pair clustering (see Section 4.1). � is then applied to these bounds analogous to the clustering technique used in the DBSCAN algorithm. For example, for � = 10 and core points <C-338, S-541> and <C-339, S-542>, a state machine that uses range-based matching will consider client-to-server packets with lengths in [328, 349] as valid, and server-to-client packets with lengths in [531,552] as valid.
Exact matching is used when no variations in packet lengths were observed during training, and range-based matching is used if variations in packet lengths were observed during training. However, range-based matching is not performed when the signature only consists of 2 packets and/or there is an overlap between the signatures that represent different types of events (e.g., the D-Link plug's signatures for ON and OFF in Table 4) as we observed that range-based matching for 2-packet signatures generates many false positives for some signatures.
Packet Sequence Matching
As explained in Section 5.2, a state machine is maintained for each packet sequence of the signature for each flow, i.e., TCP connection for the WAN sniffer or layer-2 flow for the WiFi sniffer (see Sec. 3.3) . Each packet in the stream of packets is presented to the state machines associated with the flow that the packet pertains to. If the packet's length and direction matches that of the packet for the next state, the state machine advances and records the packet. The detection algorithm operates differently for layer-2 and layer-3 detection when the packet does not match the expected next packet. For layer-2 detection (Wi-Fi sniffer), the packet is simply ignored, and the state machine remains in the same state. For layer-3 detection (WAN sniffer), the packet causes the state machine to discard any partial match as layer-3 detection need not allow for interleaving packets as it considers individual TCP connections and can filter out TCP retransmissions (see Section 3.3). When a state machine matches its first packet and advances to the next state, a new state machine is created for the same packet sequence, but in the initial state. This is to ensure that the state machine starts at the correct first packet, e.g., when a packet of that length appears in other traffic. To bound the number of active state machines, and to minimize the number of false positives resulting from retransmissions, any state machine that advances from state s to state s + 1 replaces any existing state machine in state s + 1 iff the last packet of the newly advanced state machine has a later timestamp than that of the existing state machine. Once a state machine reaches its terminal state, the set of recorded packets is reported as a sequence match.
Declaring a Signature Match. A sequence match does not necessarily mean that the full signature has been matched. Some signatures are comprised of multiple packet sequences and all of them have to be matched (e.g., Arlo camera, see Section 4.1). Sequence matches are therefore reported to a secondary module that verifies if the required temporal constraints are in place, namely that the sequence match for packet sequence set i occurs before the sequence match for packet sequence set i+1 and that the time between the first packet of the sequence match corresponding to packet sequence set 1 and the last packet of the sequence match corresponding to packet sequence set k (for a signature with k packet sequence sets) is below a threshold (see Appendix B).
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